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Utah R. App. P.. Rule 14 "Review of Agency Order"
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ad the Board of Review err in interpretation when all things are not

iIK 1 iided to reduce benefits?

1.11.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Ward v Richfield City, 798 P. 2d 757,
759 (Utah 1990). Utah appellate courts review questions of law under a correction of error
standard, without deference to the trial court. Bellon v Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089,1092 (Utah
1991); Ward, 798R2dat 759.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff/Appellant was denied, pursuant to a final agency action October 11, 1996,
unemployment compensation for reason that he is collecting social security which, when
calculated by the Department, reduced his unemployment benefit amount to zero. Agency found
that appellant owed a no-fault overpayment of $5967 based upon the fact that he received a
retroactive social security benefit payment in March 1996 for periods of eligibility in 1995 and
1996.
Agency has defined social security benefits as "retirement" and so interpreted the statute
governing unemployment compensation. The agency concluded that appellant's unemployment
benefits should be reduced to zero and no benefits paid; however, agency definition and
application of the statute is not consistent with federal court rulings interpreting purpose of
Social Security Act.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant met all eligibility requirements for unemployment compensation pursuant to
U.C.A. 35-4-403(1) "Eligibility of Individual" and benefits were paid to him for periods of June
and July 1995, and January-May 1996.
When appellant began receiving social security benefits the agency recomputed his
unemployment compensation benefits and reduced that amount to zero pursuant to U.C.A. 35-4401(2)(c) "Computation of Benefits". The agency also determined a no-fault overpayment
existed pursuant to U.C.A. 35-4-406(5)(a) when it applied a retroactive social security payment
to past unemployment benefits appellant had received.
The agency defines social security as "retirement" under a plan maintained or
contributed to by a base period employer. The federal courts have held that social security is not
"retirement" but a form of social insurance and it is mandated by federal law that an employer
and employee pay into the fund for future benefits due the appellant; however, the agency has
defined social security as "retirement" under its definition as set out in U.A.C. R562-401-207
"Retirement or Disability Retirement Income" and the rule is contrary to federal law.
"Social Security is not a retirement plan maintained or contributed to by a base period
employer", it is not a voluntary contribution nor is it one appellant contracted for in terms of
employment; wherefore, social security contributions are required by law.
Appellant contends the agency interpretation of the statute and the statute itself is vague
as applied to him. Congress did not intend social security to be a "retirement" benefit and the
language of the Utah statute does not conform to federal law.
After exhausting all administrative remedies the appellant filed the current appeal.
v
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PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT WAS DETERMINED ELIGIBLE
FOR UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS; HOWEVER, THE
AGENCY DETERMINED THAT HIS WEEKLY BENEFIT
AMOUNT WOULD BE REDUCED TO ZERO FOR REASON
THAT HE IS RECEIVING SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS AND
RECOMPUTED BENEFITS ALREADY PAID TO HIM WHICH
CREATED A NO-FAULT OVERPAYMENT.
AGENCY PROCEEDINGS
6/6/95 appellant filed for unemployment compensation pursuant to U.C.A. 35-4-403(1)
"Eligibility of Individual" and it was determined by the agency that appellant was monetarily
eligible to receive a weekly benefit amount of $253 for twenty-six weeks effective June 4, 1995
and benefits were paid to him. [R 1-2]
July 1995 appellant returned to work until he was laid off due to reduction of force
December 1995.
January 4, 1996 appellant re-opened his unemployment claim and benefits were denied
pursuant to decision of the agency in letter 1/19/96. [R-4]
January 24, 1996 appellant filed an appeal from that decision. [R-6]
January 29, 1996 decision was made by representative of agency reversing denial of
benefits and removing benefit overpayment assessed on claim. [R-7]
February 5, 1996 appellant filed an appeal of decision 1/29/96. [R-8]
February 20, 1996, pursuant to agency notice, agency decisions were reversed,
appellant's appeals were withdrawn and unemployment benefits paid to appellant. No hearing
was held on the matter. [R-9]
May 3, 1996 appellant again filed for unemployment benefits. [R 10-11]
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May 31, 1996, Unemployment Benefit Overpayment Notice was issued denying benefits
and notice that a no-fault overpayment of $401 had been created. [R-13]
May 31, 1996 Unemployment Benefit Overpayment Notice was issued as a result of
recomputation of benefits paid on claim and a no-fault overpayment of $5566 had been created.
[R-14]
May 31, 1996 Decision of Eligibility for Unemployment Benefits was issued that base
period wages used to calculate weekly benefit amount have been reduced "...because you have
begun to receive retirement benefits based upon your work which are deductible from your
claim..:'. [R-17]
June 6, 1996 Statement of Retirement Income filed by appellant. [R-16]
June 3, 1996 determination of benefit amount recomputed to reduce weekly benefit
amount to zero sent to appellant. [R-17]
June 6, 1996 appellant filed an appeal from Decision of Representative. [R-18]
June 13, 1996 Determination of Benefit amount and Notice of Agency Action and
Formal Adjudicative Proceeding mailed to appellant. [R-22]
June 17, 1996 appellant filed an Appeal from Decision of Representative. [R-23]
Notice of Hearing mailed to appellant June 20, 1996 scheduling hearing for July 1, 1996.
[R-27]
July 1,1996 hearing held before the agency. [R 28-54]
July 3, 1996 Decision of Administrative Law Judge mailed to appellant. [R 55-59]
July 26, 1996 appellant filed Appeal to the Board of Review. [R-60]
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September 9,1996 Decision of the Board of Review issued and mailed to appellant.
[R 64-69]
September 16, 1996 and September 20, 1996 appellant filed a Request for
Reconsideration with the Board of Review. [R 69-70; R-74]
October 11,1996 Reconsideration and Decision of Board of Review issued and mailed to
appellant. [R 76-79]
November 16, 1996 Petition For Writ of Review filed by appellant. [R 80-82]
It was determined by the agency that appellant had received retroactive social security
payments for various months he claimed unemployment insurance, specifically unemployment
benefits received for the months of June and July 1995 and January 1996 through May 1996.
All retirement elements had been met so as to constitute a recomputation of claimants
weekly benefit amount and concluded that appellant was receiving Social Security retirement
income which reduced his benefit amount by $267, to zero dollars and appellant was not
monetarily eligible to receive unemployment benefits on benefit claims filed effective June 4,
1995 through June 2, 1996.
The Administrative Law Judge in his Conclusions of Law stated pursuant to U.C. A. 35-4401(2) of the Utah Employment Security Act that benefits payable to an individual eligible to
receive retirement benefits must be recomputed and based authority for recomputation under
U.A.C. R562-401-207 "Retirement or Disability Retirement Income".
The Administrative Law Judge also found that appellant was not entitled to the
unemployment benefits but is without fault in doing so, and need not repay the sum but the sum
will be deducted from any future benefits payable to him.
4

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT
U.A.C. R562-202-101 "Preamble" states as follows:
"(I) One of the purposes of the Employment Security Act, Utah
Code Section 35-4-101 et seq., the Act, is to lighten the burdens of persons
unemployed through no fault of their own by maintaining their purchasing
power in the economy. The legislature, in establishing this program,
recognized the substantial social ills associated with unemployment and
sought to ameliorate these problems with a program to pay workers for a
limited time while they seek other employment. It is because of these
reasons that it is in the public interest to liberally construe and administer
the Act...:'
Purpose of the Employment Security Act is to provide temporary benefits for the
unemployed worker who qualifies under provisions of the Act to help alleviate any hardship.
Appellant had qualified, pursuant to eligibility requirements, and was experiencing a hardship
which enabled him to collect unemployment compensation. Unemployment is not welfare,
social security or a disability payment. It is not intended to provide households with a means of
support but as a means to tide them over until other suitable employment is found.
Eligibility was based in part on the fact that appellant had earned wages in two or more
calendar quarters of the base period and total base period earnings were at least 1.5 times the
wages in the highest quarter. Appellant was not receiving social security benefits at the time of
his initial claim; however, it was disclosed to the agency that he had applied for social security
benefits and all forms filed by appellant reflect that fact. [R-1,4,10,16]
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Pursuant to California Dept Of Human Resources v Java 402 US 121,28 L Ed 2d
666,91 S Ct 1347 (1971) the court held as follows:
"...@pg 676 [h]istory makes clear that the thrust of the scheme for
unemployment benefits was to take care of the need of displaced workers,
pending a search for other employment..."
"...@pg 674Unemployment benefits provide cash to a newly
unemployed worker 'at a time when otherwise he would have nothing
to spend", serving to maintain the recipient at subsistence levels without
the necessity of his turning to welfare or private charity...
...Finally, Congress viewed unemployment insurance payments as
a means of exerting influence upon the stabilization of industry. "Their only
distinguishing feature is that they will be specially earmarked for the use of
the unemployed at the very times when it is best for business that they should
be soused...."
Appellant was a displaced worker when he applied for and was determined eligible for
unemployment compensation. He was truly experiencing a hardship given the fact that he was
earning no other income at the time he applied for unemployment compensation.
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS - RETIREMENT
Appellant is receiving old age benefits under the Social Security program which is
primarily designed for persons who are no longer in the labor market. This does not mean that a
person drawing old age benefits is disqualified from drawing unemployment benefits

Commissioner of Labor v Renfroe, 486 SW2d 73, 56 ALR3d 547 (Ark 1972)
"...@pg 551...Retirement pay is generally considered not to be a pension
or gratuity but as adjusted compensation presently earned by an employee but
payable in the future...."
" @Pg 551...Perhaps the definition should more appropriately be stated
conversely, i.e., retirement pay is compensation currently paid but previously
earned by an employee. However the distinction may be stated, the various facets
6

of the Social Security Law prevent the benefits payable thereunder from falling
into the category of retirement pay as defined above...."
"...@pg 551 ...In the absence of any statutory definition of the term
"retirement payment", we feel that the generally accepted concept of retirement
pay should govern and that the result reached by the Indiana and Idaho courts
is preferable to the urged by appellant...."
Retirement pay is generally considered not to be a pension or gratuity but as adjusted
compensation presently earned by an employee but payable in the future. The court has
recognized that retirement pay falls into the category of compensation, at least when financed
over a period of years by the joint contributions of both the employer and employee.
Social security payments may not be subject to classification as gratuities, but the
concept is such that it would be difficult to say that they are "retirement payment" in the sense of
the Employment Security Act. The Social Security system may be accurately described as a
form of social insurance, enacted pursuant to Congress' power to "spend money in aid of the
general welfare" whereby persons gainfully employed, and those who employ them, are taxed to
permit the payment of benefits to the retired and disabled and their dependants. A worker's
benefits are not dependent upon the degree to which he was called upon to support the system by
taxation.
Social security payments can be deprived by appropriate government action if the
beneficiary earns more than a stated annual sum unless he has passed the age of 72. An
employee over 65 may receive social security payments without retiring so long as his earnings
from employment do not exceed the statutory limit.
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The State of Utah has defined retirement as follows:
U.A.C. R562-401-207 "Retirement or Disability Retirement Income"
"...(2)(a)
Retirement income is defined as a pension or plan, paid for
at least in part by an employer as contrasted to a IRA, KEOGH or other savings
program which provides periodic payments following discontinuance of service to
an individual who qualifies for the payment because of age, length of service,
disability or combination of these qualifications...." (Emphasis Added)
U.C.A. 35-4-401(2)(c) "Computation of Benefits"
"...(2)(c)
"...The "weekly benefit amount" of an individual who
is receiving, or who is eligible to receive, based upon the individual's previous
employment, a pension, which includes a governmental, social security, or other
pension, retirement or disability retirement pay, under a plan maintained or
contributed to by a base-period employer is the "weekly benefit amount" which
is computed under this section less 100% of such retirement benefits, that are
attributable to a week, disregarding any fraction of $1...." (Emphasis Added)
An employer and employee are required by law to contribute 7.65% to the social security
program and given the fact that an employer and employee are required by law to contribute to
the social security system means that it is not a "plan maintained or contributed to by a base
period employer" pursuant to the state statute.
Social Security is a noncontractual benefit under the social welfare program and not a
"retirement" plan as defined by the state of Utah; therefore, appellant has no choice but to
contribute and his contributions are not made pursuant to any employment contract or benefit he
contracted for but mandated by federal law.
Appellant's determination of eligibility for social security payments were made based
upon employment earnings from 1937 to the end of 1994. Any other wages earned by appellant
after 1994 will not be used by social security to increase benefit payments. Appellant is
receiving all he will ever receive from social security. The statutory right to benefits is directly
8

related to years worked and amount earned by a covered employee and not to the need of the
beneficiary directly and benefits have been afforded as a matter of right, related to past
participation in the productive processes of the country.
Persons gainfully employed and those who employ them are taxed to permit the payment
of benefits to the retired and disabled and their dependents The expectation is that many
members of the present productive work force will in turn become beneficiaries rather than
supporters of the program. Each workers benefits, though flowing from the contributions he
made to the national economy while actively employed, are not dependent on the degree to
which he was called upon to support the system by taxation. The noncontractual interest of an
employee covered by the Act cannot be soundly analogized to that of the holder of an annuity,
whose right to benefits is bottomed on his contractual payments.
Appellant is being penalized for being age 65 and not a "favorable employee in the work
force due to his age". The evidence is impressive that among workers the younger men and
women are preferred over the older. In times of retrenchment the older are commonly the first
to go, and even if retained their wages are likely to be lowered based upon the fact that a 65 year
old is not considered a good risk for employment training and expenditures for his employment
since the likelihood is great that he would not be there for many years and the company could
not recoup their investment based upon his work.
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Persons aged 65 or older are limited in the types of employment they could obtain by
virtue of the fact that employers do not hire these people for high paying jobs instead they hire
them at the lowest wage possible therefore persons aged 65 or older still have to maintain some
type of income to meet their monthly needs.
Under the rules as set out by the agency persons aged 65 or older are double penalized if
they collect social security benefits; however, the social security system was not designed nor
intended to be a "retirement plan maintained or contributed to by a base period employer" but
one of social insurance that was previously earned by an employee but payable in the future.
Social security benefits are to some degree in the nature of insurance, providing present
security and peace of mind from fear of future lack of earnings.
The court in Flemmiag v Nestor 363 US 603,4 L Ed 2d 1435,80 S Ct 1367 (1960) held
as follows:
"...@pg 1443...Payment under the Act are based upon the wage earner's
record of earnings in employment or self employment covered by the Act, and
take the form of old-age insurance benefits inuring to the wage earner...
"...Entitlement to benefits once gained is partially or
totally lost if the beneficiary earns more than a stated annual sum, unless he
or she is at least 72 years old...
"...The social security system may be accurately described as a form of
social insurance, enacted pursuant to congress' power to "spend money in aid of
the 'general welfare,5" Helvering v Davis, supra (301 US at 640)...."
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" @pg 1444...Social Security benefits is in one sense "earned", rests
on the legislative judgment that those who in their productive years were
functioning members of the economy may justly call upon that economy, in
their later years for protection from "therigorsof the poor house as well as
from the haunting fear that such a lot awaits them when journey's end is near."
Helvering v Davis, supra (301 US at 641)...."
States cannot and should not be allowed to subvert congressional intent of the enactment
of the social security act otherwise it would raise a constitutional problem of equal protection for
reason that each state would be free to interpret the effect that social security would have with
regards to its own residents. In order to have a uniform national standard in which all persons
are treated equally based upon contribution it is necessary that there be one uniform
interpretation of what social security constitutes and it does not constitute an employee pension
plan.
If the agency can determine, based upon their interpretation of the law, that as long as an
employer contributes to social security while you are employed by them during the base period
then the agency can deduct all social security payments from your unemployment benefits it
would be contrary to the intent of the Social Security Act.
The agency by creative interpretation is denying appellant's right to social security
benefits by defining them as "retirement" even though Congressional intent was that they are
"old age benefits and a form of social insurance" to keep people like appellant from the rigors of
the poor house; however, social security benefits do not provide nor maintain the quality and
dignity of life but they do insure some form of old age supplement.
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Pursuant to the states definition of retirement it is contrary to federal law and is not
consistent with the purpose of the Social Security act which considers social security to be "old
age benefits or a form of social insurance". For the state of Utah to make "social security"
benefits a disqualifying remuneration it should have listed it as a separate category.
RECOMPUTATION OF BENEFITS
The decision by the agency to recompute benefits payable to appellant was pursuant to
U.C.A. 35-4-401(2)(c) "Computation of Benefits" as follows:
"The "weekly benefit amount" of an individual who is receiving, or
who is eligible to receive, based on the individual's previous employment, a
pension, which includes a governmental, social security, or other pension,
retirement or disability retirement pay, under a plan maintained or contributed
to by a base period employer is the "weekly benefit amount" which is
computed under this section less 100% of such retirement benefits, that are
attributable to a week, disregarding anyfractionof $1."
therefore appellant's weekly unemployment compensation benefit was reduced 100% and
benefit amount calculated to be zero based upon the fact that he was receiving social security
benefits.
During hearing July 1, 1996 held before the Administrative Law Judge, Norman Barnes,
appellant stated his disagreement with U.C.A. 35-4-401(2) "Computation of Benefits" and the
Judge indicated as follows: [Transcript Page 14 line 6-20]
JUDGE

It doesn't matter what they pay in to the Social Security. It doesn't
matter the amount they pay in. It only matters, from the law, whether
or not that employer is a contributing employer. That's all it's
saying. We'll cut out the rhetoric and it's telling you that if the
employer is paying in to the social security - the base period
employer is paying in to the social security fund, then those monies
would be deducted. Not at the amount they pay in.
12

CLAIMANT They can take everything from 637 down and say that they can take
that away from my unemployment? Everything I make from 1937
through 1994.
JUDGE

Again, what the law is trying to get around or trying to look at is
the individual that may have already been receiving social
security benefits, and he works for another employer that after
that period of time-after the period of time that he's filing for
social security benefits and that employer then did not
contribute it to the amount that he's receiving in social security
benefits.

[Transcript pg 19 line 1-10]
JUDGE

Again, what a—what a rule actually does Mr. Harrington is it
further identifies the law. If you can show me that there ...

CLAIMANT Well...
JUDGE
The role of the Department is in conflict with the law, (undiscernible)
CLAIMANT Well to—Well to me, you're interpreting it one way, I'm
interpreting it another.
JUDGE

Well guess whose interpretation is going to count in this case?

Clearly, if the agency interpretation is in conflict with the legislative intent, it is not the
agency duty to interpret the legislative intent.
The agency application and interpretation of the statute, as explained to appellant during
hearing 7/1/96 [R-4; T-13, Line 36-38] is that the state considers social security to be retirement
under a plan maintained or contributed to by a base period employer. If any base period
employers contribute to social security, the agency would then consider the social security you
receive as retirement.
Any base period employer who pays into the social security fund during anytime
claimant is employed by them the agency considers all social security benefits paid into the fund
13

to be retirement and subject to deduction; however, the agency will not deduct any moneys paid
into the fund by the base period employer at the amount they paid in but will consider total
social security benefit payment to be deductible. [R-42; T-14 , Line 6-20]
The way the statute reads, if any person, collecting social security payments and
employed, should ever become unemployed through no fault of their own and experience a
temporary hardship, said person would never receive unemployment compensation if their base
period employer has paid into the social security fund. The agency has effectively routed
unemployment funds into their agency with the intention of never paying any funds to the
unemployed worker who collects social security benefits. This goes against public policy and
legislative intent enacting the unemployment compensation act.
The state cannot take away a persons right to social security by creatively defining it as
"retirement" and then recompute their weekly unemployment benefit amount to be reduced by
the amount of social security received.
NO-FAULT OVERPAYMENT
A no-fault overpayment was created by the agency when appellant received a retroactive
social security check in March 1996; however, this was after the time appellant had filed for
unemployment benefits, had filled out the application for benefits correctly, and stated that he
had applied for Social Security benefits. The Department was notified that appellant had applied
for social security and continued to determine his eligibility and pay unemployment benefits
directly to the appellant.
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In January 1996 appellant began to receive monthly social security checks and this was
disclosed by him to the agency when his unemployment claim was re-opened by filling out the
"Retirement Income Form" [R-4,16]. The agency determined him eligible for unemployment
compensation then later reversed that decision and created a no-fault overpayment due to the
agency.
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that appellant "...had properly notified the
Department that he had filed for Social Security benefits when he filed an additional claim in
January 1996. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that the claimant attempted to
mislead the Department as to his eligibility for Social Security benefits...claimant was not at
fault in the creation of the $5,967 overpayment for the weeks he claimed and received
unemployment benefits...". [R-59]
U.A.C. R562-406-502 "Responsibility"
(1)
The claimant is responsible for providing all of the information
requested in written documents as well as any verbal request from a Department
representative. If the claimant has provided such information, then receives
benefits to which he is not entitled through an error of the Department or an
employer, he is not at fault for the overpayment.
(2)
"Through no fault of his own" does not mean the claimant can
shift responsibility for providing correct information to another person such as
a spouse, parent or friend. The claimant is responsible for all information
required on his claim..."

15

Pursuant to the agency's own rule, appellant is not responsible for the creation of the
overpayment and the agency has the burden of responsibility when appellant had notified the
Department of the filing for social security benefits, had marked all appropriate boxes on his
claims for unemployment compensation that appellant had applied for social security benefits
and had notified the agency as early as his first claim for benefits 6/6/95.
Appellant is in a "Catch-22" situation wherein it would be a hardship to penalize him for
a situation that was not created by himself, he has no resources to pay the departments "no-fault
overpayment" and should he secure any future employment appellant would only be allowed a
certain income pursuant to his social security guidelines. Appellant would never qualify for
unemployment benefits pursuant to the agencies interpretation of the statute should he be out of
work through no fault of his own.
Appellant was entitled to unemployment benefits and if any no-fault overpayment exists
then it should be waived by the agency since it would create a hardship now and in the future for
the appellant to repay.
Appellant was a displaced worker when he applied for and was determined eligible for
unemployment compensation. He was truly experiencing a hardship given the fact that he was
receiving no other income at the time he applied for unemployment compensation. Appellant
made full disclosure to the agency that he had applied for social security benefits; however, no
social security benefits were paid to him during his initial claim for unemployment
compensation.
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Appellant again is in a "Catch-22" situation wherein he was awarded unemployment
compensation due to his status as a displaced worker and had met eligibility requirements. He
furthermore sought other employment and when found he again returned to the work force. Due
to appellant's age he is required to perform certain duties at a lower rate of pay therefore it puts
him in a situation of collecting social security payments in addition to work to make ends meet
and not become a public charge.
To assess a no-fault overpayment to appellant with no resources to repay it would make
it a hardship and also it was not the intent of Congress to penalize him for collecting social
security benefits while trying to maintain a quality of life and not one of public charge.
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS
Article I Section 27 of the Utah Constitution states that "frequent recurrence to
fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free
government".
By virtue of appellant receiving social security benefits the agency requires him to fill
out a "Retirement Income Form" and determined, pursuant to statute, that his unemployment
compensation benefits would be reduced to zero based upon "retirement" received, is not what
Congress had intended, nor is social security defined as retirement but social insurance. Asking
claimant to disclose any social security or other retirement payments received and not base the
hardship decision of unemployment compensation upon his household income is not a
fundamental principle of fairness.
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To penalize a claimant based upon his collection of "social security" or "retirement"
payments and not penalize another is fundamentally unfair; however, a spouse may very well be
getting payment for a pension plan or social security benefits and as the agency determination of
a hardship is applied is unfair. Not applying household income in making determination of a
hardship is in and of itself discriminatory and fundamentally unfair.
Amendment Fourteen United States Constitution states that one individual cannot be
treated differently than another; however, that is what the agency is doing in determining
eligibility of compensation.
Where there is a mixed question of state and federal law, federal law should prevail
pursuant to the United States Constitution supremacy clause.
CONCLUSION
Appellant was entitled to unemployment compensation and should not be penalized for
receiving social security benefits since Congressional intent and federal courts have stated that
social security is a type of social insurance not "retirement" as defined by Utah statute.
Appellant also was not at fault in the creation of a no-fault overpayment award and this
award should be set aside and appellant determined not to owe the overpayment pursuant to the
agency interpretation of what defines "retirement".
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RELIEF REQUESTED
Appellant requests the court (1) reverse the agency ruling denying unemployment
compensation and assessing a no-fault overpayment award and (2) find that the state of Utah's
statutory interpretation of "retirement" is not consistent with federal law and Congressional
intent that there be one uniform national standard.
DATED this n ?L day of
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Eugene Q. Harrigton
Appellant Pro Se
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P.O. Box 45244
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244
Certified Mail #P557-277-614

JZ's.-r^/u- &

" J \ \ J L A ^ Lo

x^ c ^ ^ ^ - ^ - v v

Mt.
t

^VJU^^CX^

/fit^Jp-rf,

Ve-

1>-^

